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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Utah Code Annotated § 78-2a3(j) (1953 as amended). 1

NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
This case is an appeal from a final order from the Fourth Judicial District Court of Utah
County, State of Utah, entered by the Honorable Steven L. Hansen, on May 12, 1998. A
subsequent motion for a new trial or to correct judgment was denied by the court on October
1, 1998.

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED AND
APPROPRIATE STANDARDS OF REVIEW
1.

Did the Court err in modifying the original decree of divorce by awarding the

personal property of the residence to the Plaintiff.
This is a mixed question of law and fact which the Court should review for correctness.
Heber City. Corp. v. Simpson, 942 P.2d 307, 309 (Utah 1997)
2.

Did the trail court err in refusing to award Robin Nielsen credits for his

destroyed automobile and household furnishing against the amount of his support obligation.
This is a mixed question of law and fact which the Court should review for correctness.
Heber City. Corp. v. Simpson, 942 P.2d 307, 309 (Utah 1997)
3.

Did the trial court err in applying the statute of limitations against Robin

Nielsen's claims for off sets for his lost household furnishings and automobile proceeds.

Hereafter all references to the Utah Code Annotated shall be to the 1953 code as amended
unless otherwise noted.
1

1

The application of a statute of limitations is a question of law which the Court reviews
for correctness. Gramlich v. Munsey, 838 P.2d 1131, 1132 (Utah 1992).
4.

Did the trial court err in its calculation as to the amount of support obligation

owing by Defendant Robin Nielsen.
This is a question of law which the Court reviews for correctness. Gramlich v.
Munsey, 838 P.2d 1131, 1132.
5.

Did the trial court err in allowing Plaintiff to amend her complaint to plead for

renewal of the two prior judgments.
The trial court's decision to allow an amendment of a complaint is reviewed under an
abuse of discretion standard. Kasco Services Corp. v. Benson, 831 P.2d 86, 92 (Utah 1992).
6.

Did the trial court err in awarding damages to Plaintiff under the doctrine of

constructive trust where the Court had previously found Plaintiff had no standing to raise such
a claim and that further any such claim was barred by the statute of limitations.
This is a question of law which the Court reviews for correctness. Gramlich v.
Munsey, 838 P.2d 1131, 1132.

DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL
PROVISION STATUTE AND RULES
The determinative statutes and rules in this case are reproduced herein as Addendum
"B"

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This case is a continuation of a long standing domestic dispute between the Plaintiff,
LaRee Nielsen and the Defendant, Robin Nielsen. Defendant Rod Nielsen is the brother of
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Robin Nielsen and has been dragged into this fray by the Plaintiff in her attempt to retrieve and
recover assets to pay what she alleges are owed deficiencies in alimony and child support.
Robin and LaRee Nielsen were divorced pursuant to an order dated July 16, 1984. During the
couples marriage they had six children. The original decree of divorce awarded five of the
children to Defendant Robin Nielsen and one child to the Plaintiff LaRee Nielsen.
Subsequently the defendant Robin Nielsen was sent to the Utah State Prison. A
modified decree of divorce was entered restoring custody of the remaining children to the
Plaintiff LaRee Nielsen. While Robin Nielsen was incarcerated LaRee Nielsen obtained a
judgment against him for amounts allegedly owing for child support and alimony. She also
obtained a judgment for the award of one half of Mr. Nielsen's retirement.
Shortly before going to the Utah State Prison. Robin Nielsen transferred his interest in
the residence to his brother Rod Nielsen. The basis for that transfer was for debts owing to
Rod Nielsen for moneys advanced to Robin by Rod. No further actions were undertaken by
any party until March 7, 1995 when this action was commenced by the Plaintiff.
The complaint set forth two causes of action. The first cause of action was a claim that
the transfers from Robin Nielsen to Rod Nielsen constituted a fraudulent conveyance under the
fraudulent conveyance statutes of the state. The second cause of action was a claim for quiet
title to certain real property that had been the marital home of Plaintiff and Defendant Robin
Nielsen. This claim for quiet title was based on Plaintiff's claim that neither defendant had
made any contributions towards the upkeep of the property. No action was brought to renew
either of the two judgments entered against the Defendant Robin Nielsen.
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Over the course of the proceedings cross motions for summary judgment were filed by
the parties. The court denied the Plaintiffs motion for summary judgment. In response to the
Defendant's motion for summary judgment Plaintiff first raised the issue of constructive trust
with respect to the real property.
By way of memorandum decision the trial court granted the Defendants summary
judgment as to the fraudulent conveyance claims and with respect to the constructive trust
claims. The court specifically found that issues of fact regarding the set-off issue precluded
summary judgment of that issue and reserved it for trial.
At trial Plaintiff presented her case and rested. Defendants' counsel moved for a
directed verdict with respect to all matters barred by the statue of limitations particularly on the
issues of the judgments which had not been renewed. The court sua sponte invited Plaintiff to
amend her complaint to renew the judgments. Defendants objected to the proposed amendment
but that objection was overruled by the court. Thereafter the defense put on their case.
After trial the court entered a ruling wherein it ruled against the set-off claim of the
Plaintiff with the exception of payments made to pay off the initial mortgage. The court
awarded all mortgage payments irrespective of the statute of limitations.
The court also entered a judgment in Plaintiffs favor by finding a constructive trust
from Rod Nielsen to Robin Nielsen for Robin Nielsen's half interest in the property and
thereafter ruling that said interest was forfeited to the Plaintiff for unpaid support and alimony.
The court based the forfeiture on a calculation the court made as to the value of the
interest in the home belonging to Robin Nielsen as opposed to the amount Robin Nielsen owed
to the Plaintiff for support and maintenance.
4

A motion for new trial or to correct judgment under Rule 59 was filed. The court
denied that motion and thereafter this appeal was taken.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

Plaintiff, LaRee R. Nielsen, and Defendant, Robin Nielsen, were previously

husband and wife. R. 381
2.

Defendant, Rod Nielsen, is the brother of Defendant, Robin Nielsen. R. 256

3.

Robin and LaRee Nielsen had six children during their marriage. R. 381

4.

Robin and LaRee Nielsen were divorced, pursuant to an Order dated July 16,

1984. R. 381
5.

At the time of the filing of the Decree ofDivorce it appeared that the children'

names and ages were as follows: R. 325

6.

Anne Marie Nielsen

18

David Aaron Nielsen

16

James Andrew Nielsen

14

John Aric Paul Nielsen

12

Marc Allen Phillip Nielsen

8

Curtis Anthony Peter Nielsen

4

At the time of the divorce Robin Nielsen was granted custody of all of the

children, except for Curtis, and Robin Nielsen was given possession of the family home, until the
youngest child reached the age of 18 years. R. 381
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7.

Pursuant to the Decree of Divorce, the Court awarded one half of the real property

and the home in which they lived (716 West 580 South, Orem, Utah) to each party excepting a
$6,000.00 credit going to Robin Nielsen. R. 380
8.

Pursuant to the Decree of Divorce, Robin Nielsen was awarded all of the

household furniture and furnishings. R. 381
9.

Pursuant to the Decree of Divorce, Robin Nielsen was ordered to pay, to Rod

Nielsen, those sums advanced by Rod for the van acquired by Robin and LaRee Nielsen. R.
10.

Pursuant to the Decree of Divorce, Robin Nielsen was ordered to pay $200.00 per

month of alimony and $200.00 per month for support of Curtis. R. 380
11.

On January 8, 1986 Robin Nielsen transferred his interest in the real property,

awarded to him in the divorce, by quit claim deed which was recorded in the Utah County
Recorders Office on January 10, 1986 to Rod Nielsen. R. 377-378
12.

Plaintiff discovered the transfer to Defendant Rod Nielsen no later than March 15,

1991. R. 253
13.

The approximate value of the house at the time of transfer was $115,656.00.

14.

At some point subsequent to the initial Decree of Divorce the Defendant, Robin

R. 256

Nielsen, was incarcerated at the Utah State Prison. R. 379
15.

After Robin Nielsen's incarceration, LaRee Nielsen filed for a modification of the

Divorce Decree. R. 379
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16.

By way of Order dated May 15, 1987 the Decree of Divorce was modified to

provide that the four remaining minor children were put into the full custody ofLaRee Nielsen. 2
R. 379

17.

The Order also modified Defendant Robin Nielsen's support obligation to

$100.00 per month for alimony, plus $100.00 per month, per child. R. 379
18.

Pursuant to the modified Decree ofDivorce, LaRee Nielsen was granted

possession of the home, until the youngest of the minor children reached the age of majority.
R. 379
19.

A judgment was granted against Defendant, Robin Nielsen, in the amount of

$13,815.74, said amount being the Court's determination of one half of the withdrawn amount of
Robin Nielsen's retirement, plus attorneys fees and costs of suit. R. 378
20.

A letter was sent by LaRee's then attorney, Scott Harston, on July 21, 1987,

identifying Rod Nielsen as the recipient of the funds from Robin Nielsen, and demanding that
Robin have Rod pay the same to LaRee.
21.

Plaintiff received a sum of$10,288.93 against the judgement of$13,815.74

entered May 15, 1987. R. 378
22.

The Plaintiff filed an action for the collection of unpaid child support and

alimony. R. 379

2The

Order was admitted as Plaintiffs Exhibit 2.
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23.

That action resulted in a judgement dated February 1, 1988. The judgement of

February 1, 1988 purports to award the sum of$8,000.00 for back child support and alimony
from the period of August 1, 1986 to November 1, 1987. Plaintiffs Exhibit 5.
24.

The order of judgement awards in Paragraph 1 fourteen months of delinquent

child support beginning August 1986 through and including November 1987 in the amount of
$400.00 per month for a total of$6,400.00. Plaintiffs Exhibit 5.
25.

The initial Decree ofDivorce dated July 16, 1984 awarded to the Plaintiff the sum

of$200.00 per month in child support. That order was not modified until May 15, 1987 at which
time the modified order of support was $400.00. Plaintiffs Exhibit 1, Plaintiffs Exhibit 2
26.

At the time the Divorce Decree was modified there were still four minor children

of the Plaintiff and Defendant Robin Nielsen. Those Children were James Nielsen, John Nielsen,
Marc Nielsen, and Curtis Nielsen. R.325
27.

James Nielsen turned 18 in June 1987, John Nielsen turned 18 in October 1988,

Marc Nielsen turned 18 in March of 1993, and Curtis Nielsen turned 18 in July 1997. R. 325
28.

No action was brought to renew the February 1, 1988 judgment. The February 1,

1988 judgment was not referenced in the complaint filed in the current matter in any fashion.
R. 378, R. 1-5
29.

After Plaintiff had rested in this case, a Motion for Directed Verdict was made by

the Defendants. Transcript pg. 50.
30.

One of the basis for that motion was that the judgment had not been renewed, in

accordance with the requirements of state statute, within the eight year period. Transcript pg. 51.
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31.

Thereafter the Court allowed the Plaintiff to amend her complaint in this action to

add a new cause of action renewing the February 1, 1988 judgment and likewise renewing the
July 27, 1987 judgment previously entered against Robin A. Nielsen. Transcript pg. 56.
32.

The Court in so ruling found that allowing the Plaintiff to amend at that point in

the proceeding would not materially prejudice the Defendants. Transcript pg. 56.
33.

Sometime after their divorce the Defendant Robin A. Nielsen was

institutionalized at the Utah State Hospital. Transcript pg. 63.
34.

During that period of time the Plaintiff drove the vehicle belonging to Robin

Nielsen. Transcript pg. 63.
35.

Plaintiff was involved in an automobile accident which destroyed the vehicle.

Transcript pg. 63.
36.

A check was issued by the insurance company in the name of Robin Nielsen in

the sum of$3,500.00. Transcript pg. 63 and R. 328
37.

The Plaintiff took that check and converted the proceeds therefrom to her own

personal benefit. R. 328
38.

The Plaintiff took and converted all ofthe personal property awarded to Robin

Nielsen in the home to her own personal benefit. Transcript pg. 61-62
39.

The undisputed testimony at trial was that the property had a value of $25,000.00.

Transcript pg. 62
40.

This action was commenced on March 7, 1995. R-5

41.

During the course of proceedings Defendants filed a Motion for Summary

Judgment. R. 98
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42.

By Memorandum Decision dated November 15, 1996 the Court partially granted

Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. R. 256
43.

Within that Memorandum Decision the Court specifically held that Plaintiffs

claims brought under the Utah Fraudulent Transfer Act and under the doctrine of constructive
trust were barred by the relevant statute oflimitations. The Court also found that the claim for
constructive trust was barred due to Plaintiffs lack of standing. R. 250
44.

The sole issue upon which the Court did not grant Defendants summary judgment

was the issue of the off sets claimed by the Plaintiff against Defendant Rod Nielsen. The Court
found there existed issues of material fact precluding the grant of summary judgment on that
issue. R. 250
45.

By specific finding of fact after the trial the Court found the Plaintiff was not

entitled to any off sets for those expenditures. R. 374
46.

After trial the Court entered judgment renewing the judgments of May 15, 1987

and February of 1988, denying Robin Nielsen any off sets for any home furnishings or the
converted proceeds from the destruction of his vehicle. R. 374-375
47.

The Court further established a constructive trust ofthe real property transferred

by Robin Nielsen to Rod Nielsen and in essence awarded the property back to Robin Nielsen and
thereafter awarded the property to the Plaintiff to off set the judgment that the Court was entering
in her favor. R. 374-375
48.

The Defendants filed a Motion For New Trial and pointed out to the Court that the

sole basis for the award of the property to Robin Nielsen and subsequently to the Plaintiff were
claims that the Court had previously ruled barred by the statute of limitations. R. 383
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49.

The Court denied the Motion For New Trial. R. 429

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
This case comes before the court on a number of very distinct and clear cut issues. The
first issue deals with the courts unilateral disregard of the decree of divorce. In the decree of
divorce Defendant Robin Nielsen was awarded all of the household furnishings that had
belonged to the parties. The undisputed testimony at trial was that those assets were worth
$25,000.00. The undisputed testimony at trial also provided that the Plaintiff LaRee Nielsen
had taken all of those assets and converted them to her own use. The court held that the
personal property was intended solely to fall to _the benefit of the individual who was to reside
in the house. In the original decree of divorce the Defendant Robin Nielsen was awarded
tenancy in the home until the youngest child was 18. When the divorce decree was modified
the Plaintiff was awarded the right to live in the home until the youngest child was 18. The
modified decree of divorce did not award the personal property to the plaintiff.
No argument was made at trial that the personal property awarded to the Defendant
Robin Nielsen was intended to go with the home. There was absolutely no evidence to support
such a finding. No attempt was made to modify the decree of divorce to change that award of
personal property to the Defendant Robin Nielsen. The trial court clearly abused its discretion
in holding that the personal property awarded to Defendant Robin A. Nielsen by the original
decree of divorce and left as an award to him by the modified decree of divorce in some
fashion should pass to the Plaintiff in this case.
There are a number of errors in the way that the court calculated the amount of
damages purportedly owed to LaRee Nielsen. One clear error was in failing to give Mr.
11

Nielsen credit for funds which LaRee Nielsen admitted that she had received. Another error
was in sticking to the dollar amount as set forth in judgment entered in the Plaintiffs favor in
1987 for back support and alimony. Aside from the fact that the court improperly allowed the
judgment to be renewed, the judgment contains errors plain on its face in that the simple
mathematical calculation in comparing the figures put in the judgment to those of the actual
divorce decree show that the amounts claimed are excessive.
The trial court also erred, in calculating the amount purportedly owing by Defendant
Robin Nielsen, in that it failed to give him credit for the amount of insurance proceeds which
LaRee Nielsen admitted that she took as a set-off against the amount she claimed owing from
Robin Nielsen. Where the Plaintiff had already admitted receiving the funds it was clearly
plain error for the court to rule that there was insufficient evidence to establish that fact.
The next series of defenses are problems that relate to the statute of limitations. The
trial court allowed the amendment of the complaint after the Plaintiff had rested her case, in
order to save the judgments previously entered. There is no argument that the statute would not
have expired on the renewal of the judgments if the trial court did not allow them to be added
to this suit. The trial court found that there was no prejudice to the Defendants but that is plain
error. At a bare minimum Defendants would have been prepared to show that the 1987
judgment was incorrect on its face and to present additional evidence with respect to that fact.
In addition if the Defendants had been aware that the court was going to allow the old costs
and fees an effort could have been made to find additional off-sets to apply against them.
The court further failed to apply the statutes of limitations precluding claims for
constructive trust . The court had already found that any claims Plaintiff might make for a
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constructive trust were barred by the statute of limitations. In spite of the court's prior ruling
that is the very basis on which the court awarded judgment to the Plaintiff in this case. The
court did not make any findings of fact different from those it found when it granted
Defendants' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. The court seems to simply have ignored
the statute of limitations all together.
The court did not ignore the statute of limitations in applying it against the defendants
however. The court found that Mr. Nielsen's claims for off-sets were barred by that statute.
This is in spite of the fact that the statute of limitations was not raised as a defense by the
Plaintiff. Under the Rules of Civil Procedure the statute of limitations is an affirmative defense
that must be plead by the party seeking to use it. The Plaintiff never even sought to use the
defense until the court raised it in her behalf sua sponte. This is plain and manifest error.

ARGUMENT
I.

THE COURT INCORRECTLY CALCULATED THE AMOUNT OWED
BY ROBIN NIELSEN.
The judgment in this case is comprised of two facets. One of those facets is the

calculation of the amount purportedly owing by Defendant Robin Nielsen to the Plaintiff
LaRee Nielsen for alimony and back child support. The second facet is the court's
determination that the amount as decreed in this judgment could be used in taking title of
certain real property located in Utah County from Defendant Rod Nielsen and awarding it to
the Plaintiff.
This section of the brief will address the issues relating to the errors the court made in
determining the amount owing from Robin Nielsen to LaRee Nielsen.
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A.

The Court Made Mathematical Errors in Calculating the Amount of Damages.
The amount of support and alimony owed by the defendant Robin Nielsen should be an

easy mathematical calculation. At the time of the divorce in July of 1984 Robin Nielsen was
ordered to pay $200.00 per month in alimony and $200.00 per month in child support. Those
obligations were amended by the modified decree of divorce entered in May of 1987. At that
time the support obligations were changed to $100.00 per minor child and $100.00 per month
alimony.
On Addendum A (attached hereto) is a listing of all of the alimony and child support
obligations of Robin Nielsen over the entire period of time from the inception of the divorce
until the entering of judgment in this matter. Also enclosed on the same schedule is an
accounting based on both judgments that have been entered in this case.
A comparison with the actual figures shows that the figure calculated by the trial court
in this matter is in plain error and must be corrected. The trial courts figure is in error even if
this court upholds every other finding by the trial court and the judgment in this matter should
be modified accordingly.

B.

Portions of the Claimed Support and Alimony Obligations and the Alleged
Deficient Judgments Are Barred by the Statute of Limitations.
There is no dispute that this action was brought on March 15, 1995 when the action

was filed. Utah case law provides that any unpaid aliinony or support is immediately a
judgment lien against the individual from whom the alimony or support is owing. The statute
of limitations for collecting such deficiencies is therefore 8 years as is set forth in Utah Code
Annotated § 78-12-22. It is undisputed that the alimony and support for the period of time
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prior to September of 1986 has not been reduced to judgment in a separate action and
accordingly is barred by the statute of limitations. This puts at issue the alimony and support
from September of 1986 through the entry of the judgment in this case in July of 1998. On the
eve of trial Plaintiff presented for the first time a claim that a judgment had been entered in her
favor in 1987 for all amounts of alimony and support owing from September of 1986 through
October of 1987. Defendants believe that that judgment was not properly renewed within 8
years as required under Utah Code Annotated § 78-12-22 and accordingly those sums likewise
cannot be recovered by the Plaintiff in this action.
It is therefore the Defendants' position that only the amount of alimony and support

owing from a period of time 8 years from the date that this action was actually filed are
recoverable. This amount can be calculated by simply of the schedule attached hereto as
Exhibit "A".

C.

The Prior Judgments Entered Against Robin Nielsen Had Expired.
As referenced above in order to remain valid a judgment must be renewed within 8

years from the date of its entering. See Utah Code Annotated § 78-12-22. Prior to resting her
case in this action the Plaintiff never filed an action to renew either judgment. The two
judgments were purportedly entered on February 1, 1988 and July 27, 1987. After the Plaintiff
had rested in this case the Defendant moved to dismiss claims for all damages barred by the
statute of limitations including the amounts purportedly due and owing under the two
judgments. The trial court sua sponte asked the Plaintiff to reopen her case to amend her
pleadings to include causes to renew the judgments and then overruled the Defendants'
objections to the same. Utah case law makes it clear that the action on the part of the court was
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improper. A number of Utah cases have made it clear that it is inappropriate for the court to
allow a party to amend their complaint when the need for an amendment was something that
should have been known well before trial and the amendment is not made until at or slightly
before trial. See e.g. Hein 's Turkey Hatcheries. Inc. v. Nephi Process in~ Plant. Inc., 24 Utah
2d 271, 470 P.2d 257 (1970); Girard v. Appleby, 660 P.2d 245 (Utah 1983); Staker v.
Huntin~ton

Cleveland

Irri~ation

Company, 664 P.2d 1188 (Utah 1983).

The prejudice suffered by the Defendants is readily apparent. Defendants were not
prepared to argue items of payment or set-off as against the old expired judgments nor were
they prepared to show in detail to the court the error that was rife within the judgment entered
purportedly in February of 1988. The trial court's direction of the Plaintiff in this action to act
in a fashion to purportedly cure the default in the defective pleadings that had been filed
resulting in material disadvantage to the Defendants and was clearly improper and an abuse of
discretion. This court should according hold that the amendments at trial were invalid and that
the judgments expired under the statute of limitations.

D.

The Defendant Robin Nielsen Is Entitled to Off-sets Against the Amounts Claimed
Owing.
At trial Defendant Robin Nielsen showed entitlement to at least two off-sets. The first

off-set was for $3,500.00 which the Plaintiff LaRee Nielsen claimed that she "garnished" in
the form of an insurance proceeds check that she cashed. The second off-set to which Mr.
Nielsen is entitled is the off-set for the value of the personal furnishings and personal property
that was located in the residence which was awarded to him under the terms of the original
divorce and which was converted by the Plaintiff LaRee Nielsen.
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With respect to the $3,500.00 the trial court found that Defendant Robin Nielsen had
not sufficiently proven this claim at trial. However, this fact was admitted by the Plaintiff.
Indeed in the joint pretrial order provided by the parties (and prepared by Mr. Moody, counsel
for the Plaintiff), it reads (under section 1, General Nature of the Claims of the Parties, Section
i. v.) "Plaintiff claims that Defendant, Robin A. Nielsen had not paid any of the child support
alimonies, or by the amended decree of divorce except the $3,500.00 garnished from the
insurance company for an automobile that was destroyed in a highway accident." R. 328 By
her own admissions in the joint pretrial order the Plaintiff knew and was aware that she had
cashed the check from the proceeds from the insurance of Mr. Nielsen's vehicle. Indeed, she
was saying that he should be credited with that amount and that she had essentially exercised a
self-help remedy in seizing those funds. That issue was not even in dispute at the time of trial,
the courts findings are clearly against the evidence made by admissions of the Plaintiff and
therefore should be modified.
With respect to the $25,000.00 of personal property, that was the amount established at
the time of trial. The value of the property is not in dispute. The trial court however, without
any argument from the Plaintiff, unilaterally ruled that the intent of the original decree of
divorce was that the personal property should follow the house. According to the trial court, at
the time control of the residence was returned to the Plaintiff she somehow was entitled to all
of the personal property that had originally gone along with it. This is directly contrary to the
plain language of the decree of divorce and involves one district judge overturning the decision
or leading to a property distribution made by another district judge of the same level. This is
even more evident when you consider the fact that the Plaintiff actually moved to have the
17

divorce decree modified in order to change the support obligation. Clearly if it had been the
intention of the trial court to have modified the decree to award the personal property to the
Plaintiff it could have done so at that time. It did not and this trial court should not have
modified the amount. Robin Nielsen is therefore clearly entitled to have the $25,000.00
credited as against the amount that he allegedly owes for the back child support and alimony.
The court went on to provide a further excuse for its refusal to grant set-offs to Robin
Nielsen. The court stated that such set-offs were barred by the statute of limitations. The
problem with this argument is that it again is an argument raised solely by the court. The
statute of limitations is an affirmative defense which under Rule 8 of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure must be clearly plead. Where that particular defense was not raised at any time by
the Plaintiff the court could not sua sponte raise that defense on the Plaintiff's behalf.
The second fault of the courts reasoning is that if it is true that the judgments are up for
renewal clearly a defendant is not precluded from providing evidence or proof of payment of
those judgments. In this case the amount converted by the Plaintiff would be more than enough
to satisfy the judgments which were purportedly entered in the Plaintiffs favor.
In determining the amount, if any, owed by the Defendant Robin Nielsen therefore the
trial courts order of the amount was in plain error and this court should reverse the same.

II.

THE TRIAL COURT IMPROPERLY SEIZED TITLE FROM ROD NIELSEN.
In order to reach its desired result the court ruled at trial that there was a constructive

trust from Rod Nielsen to Robin Nielsen and that the constructive trust was for the benefit of
the Plaintiff LaRee Nielsen and that therefore LaRee Nielsen was entitled to the property as the
value of the equity in the property was less than the amount that the court determined was
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owing on the total judgment to the Plaintiff. This argument fails for two reasons. First, any
claim for constructive trust would not have belonged to LaRee Nielsen but to Robin Nielsen
and he has never brought such a claim. Secondly, even if there were a claim for constructive
trust that particular claim would be barred by the statute of limitations.

A.

LaRee Nielsen Did Not Have Standing to Bring a Claim for Constructive Trust.
The Plaintiff had made two claims under which she claimed she was entitled to a

constructive trust. The first one is based on a claim of unjust enrichment. This very issue was
decided by the trial court on a motion for summary judgment. The trial court's ruling is clear
and correct. The court stated:
The Plaintiff also claims that a constructive trust should be established based on a claim
of unjust enrichment. Unjust enrichment is a cause of action in and of itself. First
Investment Company v. Anderson, 621 P.2d 683 (Utah 1980). In order to prove unjust
enrichment one must prove that there was: (a) a benefit conferred on one person by
another; (2) an appreciation or a knowledge by the conferee of the benefits; (3) the
acceptance or retention by the conferee of the benefit under such circumstances as to
make it inequitable for the conferee to retain the benefit without payment of its value.
Concrete Products Company v. Salt Lake County, 734 P.2d 910 (Utah 1987).
The court however, does not reach analysis of the cause of action because Plaintiff
LaRee Nielsen, lacks standing to bring such an action. Only parties to a contract, or
intended beneficiaries thereof, have standing to sue. "As a general rule, none is liable
upon a contract except those who are parties to it." Shier Development v. Frontier
Investments, 799 P.2d 221 (Utah App. 1990) citing, County of Clark v. Bonanza No.
l, 96 Nev. 643, 615 P.2d 939, 943 (Nev. 1980). "It is axiomatic in the law of contract
that persons not in privity cannot sue on a contract. ld. (Citing, Wing v. Martin, 107
Idaho 267, 688 P.2d 1172, 1177 (Idaho 1984) (lessees, who were not parties to prior
lease, were not in privity with former lessee, and therefore could not sue to enforce
terms of prior lease). In the present case it is Ron Nielsen (sp) who allegedly is unjustly
enriched, but the contract or medium through which he obtained this wealth, is between
Robin Nielsen and himself and not between LaRee Nielsen and Ron Nielsen (sp).
Therefore LaRee Nielsen does not have standing to bring an action of unjust enrichment
as to a transfer between Rod Nielsen and Robin Nielsen and, as stated before, the court
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is precluded from fmding the transfer an equitable but fraudulent transfer due to statute
of limitations. R. 250-251

B.

The Claim for Constructive Trust Is Barred by the Statute of Limitations.
Just as the trial court ruled that LaRee Nielsen had no right to sue under the doctrine of

constructive trust it also ruled that any such claim was barred by the statute of limitations. In
the court's same memorandum decision of November 15, 1996 the court found as follows:
Any claim for a constructive trust is also barred by relevant statutes of limitations, or
Plaintiff's lack of standing. A claim for constructive trust, based on fraud, is governed
by the statute of limitations found in UCA § 78-12-26(3), a three year statute of
limitations. See Baldwin v. Burton, 850 P.2d 1188 (Utah 1993). In Baldwin v. Burton,
the Utah Supreme Court addressed the issue of when the statute of limitations began to
run in a fraudulent conveyance action where real property was transferred to a relative
of the debtor. Id. The court ruled that the statute begins to run "from the time the
person entitled to the property knows, or by reasonable diligence of inquiries should
know, the relevant facts. As stated above, LaRee Nielsen admits to knowing of the
transfer on March 15, 1991, and reasonably should have known by way of the tax
notices sent to her home that her ex-husbands interest had been assigned to his brother,
Ron Nielsen, in late 1991. (See, "Exhibit E, 1991 Tax Notice, Defendant's
Memorandum in Support For Partial Summary Judgment" and "Affidavit of LaRee R.
Nielsen in Support of Summary Judgment" paragraph 6). The present action was
brought March of 1995. Clearly this case was brought more than three years after the
last event creating the cause of action, therefore any claim of fraud used to create a
constructive trust is barred by the statute of limitations.
R. 253-254
The trial court clearly ruled that any claim for constructive trust was barred by the
statute of limitations. This was even giving the Plaintiff an extra benefit of the doubt. Clearly
where the constructive trust had to be between Robin and Rod Nielsen any claim for a
constructive trust would have been brought within three years from the date of the transfer.
There could have been no question when the transfer was made between those parties as Robin
was a signatory on the deed giving the property to Rod. The undisputed testimony was that
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J.nsferreu

. Jbm to Rod Nielsen.

Three years from that date would have been 1989. Since the sole basis for the court's award of
the property from Rod Nielsen to LaRee Nielsen was the doctrine or constructive trust and the

ruling transferring the property must be reversed.
CONCLUSION
This case unfortunately appears to be one where the court bent over backwards to try
and make the law and the facts fit into what the court felt was the "best solution". Neither the
hw nor the facts support the court's ruling in any fashion. Errors from the simple

mathematical type to the blatant disregard of the trial court's own prior ruiings with respect to
Lht

statute of limitations mandate a reversal of the trial court m Ju::.

mau~;;r .

Accordmgiy lnis court sllould remand the matter back to the trial court with orders to
return title to Rod Nielsen and to adjust the amount of support obligations owed by Robin
Nielsen to LaRee Nielsen to take into account the set-offs to which he is entitled and the bar's
ot the applicable statute of limitations.
Respectfully Submitted.
/'-

DATED this

:/S

day of March, 1999.

LARSON, KJRKHAM & TURNER

"iiELSAPP BRF
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

'!
I hereby certify that on this;? ) rday of March, 1999, I mailed, postage
prepaid, a copy of the foregoing Motion for Extension of Time to the following:
Robert L. Moody (2302)
MOODY & BROWN
Attorney for Plaintiff/ Appellee
2525 North Canyon Road
Provo, Utah 84604
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ADDENDUM A
CALCULATIONS

ROBIN A. NIELSEN
ALIMONY OBLIGATIONS

DATE
DATE
#OF
FROM
TO
PAYMENTS
7/16/84
8/1/86
12
9/1/86
5/1/87
9
6/1/87
10/1/87
5
11/1/87
07/01/98
129

(1)
(2)

AMOUNT
$200.00
$200.00
$100.00
$100.00

TOTAL
$2,400.00
$1,800.00
$500.00
$12,900.00

(1)

(2)
(2)

These amounts were never reduced to judgment.
These periods were covered under the judgment of 2/1/88

Total owing from April 1, 1987 through July of 1998 (without any offsets), the period within the
statute of limitations, would be 136 payments at $100.00 for a total of $13,600.00.

ROBIN A. NIELSEN
CHILD SUPPORT OBLIGATIONS

DATt:
FROM
7/16/84
9/1/86
6/1/87
7/1/87
11/1/87
11/1/88
4/1/93

(1 )
(2)

UAfE:
#OF
TO
PAYMENTS
8/1/86
5/1/87
9
6/1/87
1
10/01/87
4
12
3/1/93
53
,...
07/01/98

.

AMOUNT
$200.00
$200.00
$400.00
$300.00
$300.00
$200.00
$100.00

TO-!AL
$2,400.00
$1,800.00
$400.00
$1,200.00
$3,600.00
$10,600.00
$6,400 00

These amounts were never reduced to judgment.
These oeriods were covered under the iudament

(1)
(2)
(2)
(2)

88

Total owing from Apr:! ~ 1937 through July of 1998 (without any offsets), the period within the
. t0tal of $22,600.00.
statute of limitations

ROBIN A NIELSEN
Judgement Calculation "7/27/87

JUDGMENT TOTAL

$13,815.74

LESS PAYMENTS

$10,288.93

BALANCE OWING
INTEREST@ 12% SIMPLE INTEREST
TOTAL OWING
ASSUMING NO CREDIT FOR ANY OFFSETS

$3,526.81
$4,549.58
$8,076.39

ROBIN A. NIELSEN
Judgement Calculation "2/1 /88

CHILD SUPPORT
ALIMONY
TOTALS
INTEREST FROM '2/1/88 TO 7/1/98
'@ 12% SIMPLE INTEREST
TOTAL

PER
JUDGMENT
$6,400.00
$1,600.00

PER
DECREES
$3,400.00
$2,300.00

$8,000.00

$5.700.00

$'10,000.00

$7,125.00

$18,000.00

$12,825.00

ASSUMING NO CREDIT FOR ANY OFFSETS
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Robert L. Moody, No. 2302
MOODY & BROWN
Attorney for Plaintiff
2525 North Canyon Road
Provo, Utah 84604
Telephone: (801) 37::.:,::::,:,1
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DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY

STATE OF UTAH
JUDGMENT AND ORDER

LAREE R. NIELSEN,
i--'i:nni1ii

V.

ROBIN

tL l"l.l:::L~ti\1

ana KULJ l'i!.t:L.)tl\1.

Civil No. 950400143
Judge Steven L. Hansen

Defendant.
The above entitled r..:.::::.. :.:.. ~.:..; ::::::::-. : .. :.: :: .• v''-'.:;:. :Le court on the ':JU1

~..l_,

February, 1998, and Plaintiff being present and represented by counsel, Robert L. i\LJvJ;.

having considered the matter and having made in writing its Finding'
- ..("
·--' '-

T

·~f

FCJ·::-!

2f'·::l

u:

u.;;\.i

C·::·:::·::-!:..:.<:i·::·:::-:

-

.!.______:•_-\,. .. -

~

1. Plaintiff is hereby awarded judgment against the Defendant, Robin Nielsen,
m lhe amount of S--1

other

claim~

I) .. r .,.:+

that either po.rty

-::nn ;;nm rr>nrew~mrniY rrw

if1ay

nrevrnus natances of all judgments and

nave against the other.

2. It is hereby decreed that all right, title and interest in the real property located
at 716 West 580 South in Orem, Utah, more particularly described as follows:
Lot 6, Plat 8, Woodcrest Heights, as recorded in the records of the
Utah County Recorder's Office.
Be and are is hereby adjudged and decreed to be the property of the Plaintiff,
LaRee R. Nielsen.
3. It is ordered that any and all other claims that any of the parties may have
against the other are hereby deemed satisfied for the reasons set forth in the Findings of Fact
and Conclusions of Law as set forth by the court.
DATED this

~~t.lf.-./;)-day of ~rilfi998.
BY THE COURT:

Approved as to form:

SHAWN D. TURNER
Attorney for Defendants
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NOTICE TO DEFENDA:\TS' .\TTOR"\'TIY
J.v.

Shawn D. Turner, Esq.
Larson, Kirkham & Turner
Attorneys for Defendants
4516 South 700 East, Suite 100
Sait Lake CHv. OT ?S4lll7
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Plaintiff, will submit rhe above and foregoing Judgment and
:.... ::iurb..:a.

the undersigned, Attornev for
OrnPr rn rnP HnnnrOJrt!e ~teven

;·v, ;,;;) signature. uoon the expiration of five \5) days from the: Jate of lim i\iotice,

plUS

three

1\.u;-:

..;.-so...;. uf tile Rules of Judicial Administratiou. h.indly govern

(3)

days for mailing

j)ATfilthlc

linle<;<: wrmPn nf"';ecr!()n !<: n IPr1

;/t~J.I

~~UMA.rml

3

!998.

prior

tO th3t tlme purSU3fH t0

you~~eif

accnrlllfl.gry.

ADDENDUMC
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES
UCA § 78-12-22 Within eight years.
Within eight years an action:
(1) upon a judgment or decree of any court of the United States; or of any state or
territory within the United States.
(2) to enforce any liability due to or become due, for failure to provide support or
maintenance for dependent children.
UCA § 78-12-25 Within four years.
Within four years:
(1) An action upon a contract, obligation, or liability not founded upon an instrument in
writing; also on an open account for goods, wares, and merchandise, and for any article
charged on a store account; also on an open account for work, labor or services rendered, or
materials furnished; provided, that action in all of the foregoing cases may be commenced at
any time within four years after the last charge is made or the last payment is received.
(2) A claim for relief or a cause of action under the following sections of Title 25,
Chapter 6, the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act:
(a)
Subsection 25-6-5(l)(a), which in specific situations limits the time for
action to one year, under Section 25-6-10;
(b)
Subsection 25-6-5(l)(b); or
(c)
Subsection 25-6-6( 1).
(3) An action for relief not otherwise provided for by law.
UCA § 78-12-26 Within three years.
Within three years:
(1) An action for waste, or trespass upon or injury to real property; except that when
waste or trespass is committed by means of underground works upon any mining claim, the
cause of action does not accrue until the discovery by the aggrieved party of the facts constituting such waste or trespass.
(2) An action for taking, detaining, or injuring personal property, including actions for
specific recovery thereof; a domestic animal usually included in the terms "livestock," which
at the time of its loss has a recorded mark or brand, if the animal strayed or was stolen from
the true owner without the owner's fault, the cause does not accrue until the owner has actual
knowledge of such facts as would put a reasonable man upon inquiry as to the possession of the
animal by the defendant.
(3) An action for relief on the ground of fraud or mistake; except that the cause of
action in such case does not accrue until the discovery by the aggrieved party of the facts
constituting the fraud or mistake.

t4) An action for a liability created by the statutes of th1s state, other than ror a penalty
or torteiture under the laws of this state, except where in special cases a different limitation is
prescribed by the statutes of this state.
(5) An action to enforce liability imposed by Section 78-17-3, except that the cause of
action does not accrue until the aggrieved party know' , ,, reasonably should knO\\
the harm
suffered.

